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THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME:
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DISABLED
PERSONS AND THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988
Susan B. Eisner
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,' often
referred to as the Fair Housing Act (FHA),2 to prohibit housing
discrimination on the basis of national origin, religion, race or color.' In
' Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994)); Arlene S. Kanter, A Home Of One's Own: The Fair
HousingAmendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People With Mental
Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. R~v. 925,927-28 (1994) (indicating that the FHA was amended in
1988 to include people with mental disabilities); Penn Lerblance, Legal Redress For Disability
Discrimination: Bob, Carol, Ted and Alice Encounter AIDS, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv.
307, 345-46 (1994) (suggesting that housing discrimination based on HIV status is protected
by the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 (FHAA) which amended the FHA); Richard B.
Sirning, The Impact ofFederalAntidiscrimination Laws On Housingfor People With Mental
Disabilities, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 413 (1991) (commenting on the interrelationship between
the FHAA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, both of which address housing
discrimination based on mental disabilities); Laurie C. Malkin, Comment, Troubles At The
Doorstep: The Fair HousingAmendments Act Of.1988 And Group Homes For Recovering
Substance Abusers, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 757, 777 (1995) (discussing how the FHAA includes
protection for recovering alcoholics and former drug addicts); Michelle R.K. Todus, Note, City
ofEdmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.: Opening Doors To Housing For Handicapped Persons,
26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 737 (1996) (discussing the impact of City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, Inc. on fair housing legislation regarding handicapped persons).
2 Lerblance, supra note 1, at 345-46; Malkin, supra note 1, at 775.
' 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994); see Kanter, supra note 1, at 934 (noting that the
enactment of the FHA extended the reach of Executive Order 11,063, which applied to race-
based discrimination in federally-assisted housing transactions); Malkin, supra note 1, at 775
(declaring that the enactment of the FHA was a decisive move by Congress in light of "racial
strife and urban unrest"); Todus, supra note 1, at 742 n.34 (stating that Congress enacted the
435
436 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol XIV
1974, the FHA was amended to prohibit discrimination based on sex.4
Significantly, neither version of the law contained any prohibition of
discrimination based on disability.5 It was not until fourteen years later
that Congress addressed the discrimination that had long confronted
disabled persons in the housing arena.6 In 1988, Congress enacted the Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA),7 which expanded the protections
guaranteed by the FHA to encompass discrimination based on a person's
physical or mental handicap.8 The FHAA covers all housing, public and
FHA in response to the turbulent social and political climate surrounding the assassination of the
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
' See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §
527, § 808(bX3), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1994)); Kanter, supra note
1, at 935.
5 See generally Kanter, supra note 1, at 935; see Simring, supra note 1, at 420. The
terms "disability" and "handicap", and variations thereof, are used interchangeably throughout
this Note. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2183 ("The Committee intends that the definition [of 'handicap'] be interpreted consistent with
regulations clarifying the meaning of the similar provision found in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act."); Kanter, supra note 1, at 946 n.143 (observing that the definitions of
"handicapped" in the Fair Housing Amendments Act at 42 U.S.C. § 3602, as well as in the
Rehabilitation Act at § 504, are basically identical, and include an extensive list of disabilities and
impairments that affect activities of daily life).
6 According to one scholar, by enacting the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Congress
took its "most important step forward in removing barriers faced by people with disabilities in
their effort to live as equal members of society." Kanter, supra note 1, at 934 (further observing
that the law did not protect disabled persons from housing discrimination); Michael P. Seng,
Discrimination Against Families with Children and Handicapped Persons Under the 1988
Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 541, 553 (1989) (recounting
Congressional findings "that widespread stereotyping of persons with handicaps resulted in their
frequent exclusion from housing.").
' Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
3601-3631 (1994)).
' Id.; Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346 (recognizing that the FHAA expanded the
notion of housing equality to encompass disabled persons); Simring, supra note 1, at 420;
Todus, supra note 1, at 742-43; see discussion infra part HI; infra notes 25-36 and
accompanying text. See generally Seng, supra note 6 (discussing the federal anti-discrimination
protection afforded to families with children by the FHAA).
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private.9 Its critical significance derives, in large part, from being the first
federal legislative effort targeting discrimination in housing opportunities
and conditions because of a person's disability.°
The FHAA is a pioneering federal initiative to create equality in
the housing arena with respect to handicapped persons." According to the
House Report on the 1988 Amendments, the Fair Housing Amendment
Act... is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the
unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American
mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and
mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals.
Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations
about threats to safety are specifically rejected as grounds to justify
9 Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 stat: 1619, 1621-1622, (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1994)); Simring, supra note 1, at 414, 420-21 (observing that, unlike
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)), which applies only to federally-assisted
housing, the FHAA applies to all housing irrespective of federal assistance); Lerblance, supra
note 1, at 346; Kanter, supra note 1, at 928, 933-34.
"o Kanter, supra note 1, at 928, 934 (noting that "[p]rior to its enactment, no federal
law specifically prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities in private and public
housing."); Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346 (discussing the way in which the FHAA "extend[ed]
the principle of equal housing opportunity to people with handicaps."); Seng, supra note 6, at
541; Simring, supra note 1, at 420-21 (distinguishing the FHAA from section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by pointing out that, "unlike section 504, which applies only to
federally assisted housing programs, the FHAA reaches private as well as public housing.").
" See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2179; Todus, supra note 1, at 742 (arguing that Congress has been an important influence in
enacting anti-discrimination laws for the benefit of handicapped persons). Under the FHAA, if
a person believes that he has been the victim of housing discrimination, he may register a
complaint with the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").
The Secretary then investigates the matter, endeavoring to reach a determination within one
hundred days. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv) (1994). If the Secretary is unsuccessful, he
must notify the complainant and respondent of the reasons for the delay. See 42 U.S.C. §
3610(g)(1) (1994). If the Secretary concludes that a reasonable cause exists to believe that
discrimination occurred or is about to occur, then he must issue a charge on behalf of the
aggrieved party. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(A) (1994). The parties to the action then have a
choice with respect to the forum for the litigation. They may litigate before either an
administrative judge or a federal district judge. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1994).
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exclusion. 12
Toward achieving housing equality for disabled persons, the
FHAA seeks to accomplish two critically important objectives: to
integrate disabled persons into the mainstream, and to increase the extent
to which disabled persons are able to enjoy living in their own homes.
With respect to the first goal, sections 3604(0(1) and (2) prohibit
discrimination based on disability in order to increase the number of
housing opportunities for disabled persons, and achieve integration.' 3
Section 3604(f)(3)(B) introduces the concept of reasonable
accommodation, which is one of the most dramatic features of the
FHAA, 4 and is designed to improve the quality of life for disabled persons
within their own homes, in fulfillment of the latter objective. 5
The FHAA represents a significant departure from the original
2 H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
1 Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1)(A), it is unlawful to make a dwelling unavailable to
a person because of such person's disability. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A), it is unlawful
to discriminate against a person in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling" because of such person's disability. See Seng, supra note 6, at 559 ("While not every
decision that has a disproportionate adverse effect on handicapped persons will violate the
[FHAA], decisions that operate to deny the handicapped equal access to housing will be
illegal.").
14 Malkin, supra note 1, at 820 (arguing that the reasonable accommodations clause
is a "clear legislative directive" that contains "language of action", rather than "language of
degree").
"S One scholar has interpreted the goals of the FHAA as "to end segregation of
housing for people with disabilities, to increase housing choices for people with disabilities, and
to require reasonable accommodations by landlords, thus allowing the disabled full enjoyment
of appropriate housing". Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346. It has also been argued that the FHAA
"was designed to achieve two purposes: (1) to end the prejudice and stereotyping directed
toward people who have mental, physical, or emotional impairments; and, (2) to integrate
effectively this traditionally excluded population into mainstream society." Malkin, supra note
1, at 776; see Adele M. Azima, Anywhere But Here: May Neighbors Prevent Group Homes For
the Mental lyDisabled?, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. REv 225 (1995) (examining Michigan Protection
and Advocacy Service v. Babin and the scope of protection for handicapped persons under the
FHAA); Simring, supra note 1, at 420 (stating that the FHAA was enacted in order "to secure
to people with disabilities the right to establish a home free of discrimination in any community
they choose, and to integrate people with handicaps into the mainstream of American life.");
H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
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FHA in two important respects. 6 First, under the FHAA, it is unlawful to
discriminate based on disability in a wide array of transactions involving
land-use decisions.'7 Second, there is scholarly debate over whether the
FHA and the FHAA share the same constitutional authority.'8
Part I of this Note explores the extent of the protections afforded
to disabled persons under the FHAA. Part II provides a brief overview of
16 Kanter, supra note 1, at 943.
17 Id. Among the transactions enumerated are "the sale, rental, financing, brokering,
appraising, making, and purchasing of loans for dwelling ... ." Id. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1994);
Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346; see H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 5 reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2174.
18 It is well-settled that the FHA derives its constitutional authority from the
Thirteenth Amendment. This proposition finds support in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. See
Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In that case, Congress held that the Thirteenth Amendment
provided the constitutional authority for the FHA because housing discrimination on the basis
of race was encompassed by "the badges and the incidents of slavery .... ." Id. at 440-41;
Kanter, supra note 1, at 944 (arguing that, based on Jones, the Thirteenth Amendment provided
sufficient constitutional authority for Congress' enactment of the FHA); see Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (declaring that the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact
legislation). It is debatable whether the FHAA also derives its constitutional authority from the
Thirteenth Amendment. The very fact that the nondiscrimination protection of the FHAA is
extended to include disability seems to dictate that another portion of constitutional text, rather
than the Thirteenth Amendment, provides the requisite authority. Kanter, supra note 1, at 944.
At least one scholar has argued that "the FHAA appears to derive its constitutional authority from
the Commerce Clause". Id; see id. at 945 n.139 (analogizing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241,255-56 (1964), in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Title II of the Civil RightsAct of 1964, to support the notion that the Commerce Clause is the
proper constitutional authority for the FHAA); Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d
249,251 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "Congress had a rational basis for deciding that housing
discrimination against the handicapped, like other forms of housing discrimination, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce."), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 65 (1996); see Seng, supra
note 6, at 542 (stating that HUT) noted that the underpinnings of the FHAA are rooted in the
Commerce Clause); cf. Kanter, supra note 1, at 944-45 & n. 140 (citing Seniors Civil Liberties
Ass'n v. Kemp, 761 F.Supp. 1528, 1545-46 (M.D.Fla. 1991), in which the FHAA was upheld
under the Commerce Clause where elderly residents of age-restricted housing unsuccessfully
challenged the FHAA's prohibition of familial discrimination). The Commerce Clause is not the
only portion of constitutional text that has been suggested as the authority for the FHAA. Three
Supreme Court Justices believed that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may have
provided the requisite constitutional authority for the FHAA. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S
745,777, 782,784 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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those persons to whom the FHAA is applicable, including the statutorily
defined class of disabled persons who are entitled to the protections
afforded by the FHAA. Part III examines the definition of housing
discrimination under the FHAA, and offers examples of discriminatory
housing practices. 9 This part also explores the concept of reasonable
accommodation, which is one of three methods that courts have employed
for evaluating landlord compliance with the FHAA,20 through an analysis
of litigation involving general landlord policies. The "reasonable
accommodation" clause continues to be an underused and ill-understood
means for vindicating the rights of disabled persons in housing matters.21
The concept of reasonable accommodation22 is chameleon-like, and it
resists a precise definition because its meaning in any housing situation
depends so heavily on the facts presented in each particular case. 3
'9 In order to establish a prima facie case of failure to make a reasonable
accommodation under the FHAA, the following elements must be proven:
(1) Complainant suffers from a handicap as defined in the [FHAA]; (2)
Respondent knows of the Complainant's disability or should reasonably be
expected to know of it; (3) Accommodation of the handicap 'may be
necessary' to afford the Complainant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy
the dwelling; (4) The accommodation is reasonable; and, 5) Respondent
refused to make such accommodation.
Exelberth v. Riverbay Corp., No. 02-93-0320-1, 1994 WL 497536 at *8 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Sept.
8, 1994).
20 Malkin, supra note 1, at 784. Courts have recognized three methods by which a
housing discrimination claim may be stated under the FHAA: "proving discriminatory intent,
proving discriminatory effect, and showing a failure to provide reasonable accommodations."
Id.
" Id. at 788-89. The author observes that claims brought under section 3604(f)(3)(B)
have only a marginal rate of success. In her view, this is because courts frequently treat the
"reasonable accommodation" clause as an element of the "discriminatory effects" test, "rather
than as an independent means to establish unlawful housing discrimination" Id. at 788.
22 The language of the FHAA does not provide a definition of reasonable
accommodation. There are, however, two examples of reasonable accommodations included
in the text of the regulations promulgated by HUD instituting the FHAA. See 24 C.F.R. §
100.202(b) (1993) and 24 C.F.R. § 100.204 (1993), corresponding to 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)
and 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), respectively.
23 United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 29 F.3d 1413,
1418 (9th Cir. 1994).
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However, with respect to the notion of reasonable accommodation, there
are some elements of constancy. To that end, a discussion of the various
accommodations requested by disabled persons that courts have
considered under the FHAA is included in this part.24  This note
concludes, in Part IV, with an evaluation of the effect of the FHAA on
eradicating discrimination against disabled persons in the ten years since
its enactment, and a brief commentary on the effects of the future
application of the FHAA.
II. PROTECTED CLASSES OF PERSONS UNDER THE FHAA
Under the FHAA, it is unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or
rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer
or renter because of a handicap .... " The FHAA specifically prohibits
housing discrimination based on a person's "handicap."26 This term has
been defined as "(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (2) a record of
having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment., 2
7
24 This note discusses the notion of "reasonable accommodation", only with respect
to challenges by individual disabled tenants to policies regulating pets, parking and fees. The
primary focus of this note is on individual handicapped tenants as aggrieved parties in fair
housing litigation. Courts have also interpreted the "reasonable accommodation" clause with
respect to zoning and land-use decisions involving the .establishment of group homes and
residential treatment facilities. Because those cases often involve organizations and not-for-profit
corporations (rather than individual handicapped persons), their status as a collection of
aggrieved parties to fair housing litigation is beyond the scope of this note. In addition, litigation
involving challenges by individual disabled tenants to housing policies not implicating parking,
pets or fees, has similarly been excluded from this note.
25 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1994).
2642 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994) (defining "handicap").
27 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1994); Kanter, supra note 1, at 947 n.152, 948 n. 153
(stating that people who were discriminated against by others who perceived them to be drug
users, but were not,were covered by the. FHAA, and citing Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Sch.,
725 F.2d 261, 26263 (5th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1974 covered students excluded from federally funded programs because they were
perceived as handicapped although they were not); Seng, supra note 6, at 554 (stating that the
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The first category included in the definition of "handicap" applies
to a person who is "unable to perform, or is significantly limited in
performing, an activity that an average person in the general population
can perform."28 Major life activities include, but are not limited to, the
abilities to see, hear, speak, walk, breathe, learn, care for one's self, and
perform manual tasks.29 This provision encompasses "[cihronic or
episodic disorders.., that are substantially limiting when active, or have
a high likelihood of recurrence in substantially limiting forms. "3 0 Multiple
sclerosis has specifically been included in this section.3' Alcoholics are
also included among the handicapped, irrespective of whether they are
participating in a treatment program.32 Current illegal users and addicts
of controlled substances are not considered to be "handicapped" within the
meaning of the FHAA,33 except in one very limited situation: drug users
and abusers are included among the handicapped only where they are
participating in a treatment program at the time the discrimination
occurs. 4 The second and third categories included in the definition of
definition of "handicap" is very broad).
' Rusinov v. Jankowski Lee & Associates, No. 05-93-0517-1, 1995 WL 399384 at
*10 (H.U.D.A.L.J. June 30, 1995).
29 Id.; see 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b) (1989); see also Cindy Lee Soper, The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: New Zoning Rules For Group Homes For The
Handicapped, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1035 (1993) (listing several "major life activities").
30Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384 at *10.
31 Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 116, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(determining that suffering from multiple sclerosis substantially limits major life activities), affld,
51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
3224 C.F.R. § 100.201 (1989); see Simring, supra note 1, at 427.
3 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3) (1994); see Simring, supra note 1, at 426 (noting that
"[tihe FHAA specifically excludes current illegal users and addicts of controlled substances from
the definition of handicap.").
1H.R. REP. No. 100-711, supra note 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183.
"Just like any other person with a disability, such as cancer or tuberculosis, former drug-
dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants simply on the basis of
status. Depriving such individuals of housing, or evicting them, would constitute irrational
discrimination that may seriously jeopardize their continued recovery." Id.; see Douglas E.
Miller, The Fair Housing Act, Oxford House, And The Limits Of Local Control Over The
Regulation Of Group Homes For RecoveringAddicts, 36 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 1467, 1483
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"handicap" are particularly significant for persons with mental disabilities
by virtue of the specific behavioral manifestations that commonly
accompany mental illness."
Contained within the statutory definition of "handicap" is a
recognition that discrimination based on disability has often swept widely
and affected many persons not generally associated with traditional notions
of handicap. Rather than "enumerat[ing] specific conditions to categorize
and determine disabilities ... [the FHAA's definition of 'handicap'] focuses
on whether persons claiming housing discrimination on the basis of their
handicaps endure physical or mental impairments" that curtail their daily
living.36
III. DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES AND THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
"[I]n addition to the more traditional techniques of demonstrating
civil rights violations,"" such as proving discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect,3" the FHAA provides a third method for establishing
an instance of discrimination which is uniquely tailored to address the
situations in which disabled persons are often placed as a result of their
handicaps - "surmountable barrier"39 discrimination. Under the FHAA,
"surmountable barrier" discrimination includes "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
(1995).
35 Kanter, supra note 1, at 947 (arguing that "people labeled mentally ill are often
regarded by others as 'handicapped' because of certain behaviors that result from their
conditions" and suggesting that "[s]uch behaviors may lead an observer to conclude that the
individual is mentally ill and to treat him or her differently as a result."); see Simring, supra note
1, at 426 (arguing that the FHAA's significance results from its mandate that unusual and
harmless behaviors resulting from mental disorders, rather than mere undesirable status, be
tolerated).
36 Malkin, supra note 1, at 779; see Simring, supra note 1, at 424 (declaring that the
FHAA's definition of "handicap" reflects a "functional" rather than a "clinical" approach).
37 Malkin, supra note 1, at 788.
38 Id. at 785.
39Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981).
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such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a disabled] person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling... 40 In circumstances
where "otherwise neutral rules of tenancy ... have the effect of denying
persons with disabilities full enjoyment of the premises," those rules "must
bend." Consistent with the goal of affording disabled persons an
equivalent quality of life within their homes, an accommodation should
enable the disabled tenant to use and enjoy the premises to the same extent
as a similarly-situated non-disabled tenant.42 The accommodation will be
successful, with respect to the disabled tenant, if it reduces the effect of the
disability on the disabled tenant, such that the disabled tenant is no more
limited or restricted in his use of the dwelling than non-disabled tenants
are, with the benefit of the accommodation.43
The notion of reasonable accommodation requires that landlords
consider requested accommodations by disabled tenants differently from
how they might have done in the past. Under the FHAA, landlords must
"respond flexibly" to both the problems faced and solutions proposed by
their disabled tenants. 4 Particularly with respect to handicapped persons,
"individualization" is an overriding and integral component of
40 42 U.S.C. § 3604(fX3)(B) (1994).
41 Stewart R. Hakola & Joseph F. Lavey I, Forty-Three Million Strong: An Overview
Of Civil Rights Protections For Persons With Disabilities, 70 MiCH. B.J. 548, 553 (1991).42Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384 at *12; F. Willis Caruso, Fair Housing Modifications
And Accommodations In The '90s, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 331, 332 & n. 9 (1996)
(suggesting that "changing the general policies of an, apartment complex regarding the use of
facilities ...or even rules with regard to support animals" may constitute reasonable
accommodations for disabled persons); Seng, supra note 6, at 555.
41 Shapiro, 844 F.Supp.. at 127 (holding that a landlord's strict adherence to a first
come/first served policy of awarding parking spaces to tenants and subsequent refusal to provide
a parking space to a tenant with limited ambulatory ability, constitutes failure to make a
reasonable accommodation to a disabled tenant because it serves to limit such tenant's use and
enjoyment of her dwelling).
4 Simring, supra note 1, at 428 (observing that this may involve an "adjust[ment] [to]
tenancy requirements" or the provision of "assist[ance] [to disabled] tenants in-meeting those
requirements and maintaining their homes."); see Caruso, supra note 42, at 340 (noting that
landlords may be required to take "affirmative steps" to ensure that a disabled person has an
equal opportunity to use and enjoy his or her dwelling).
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nondiscrimination jurisprudence.45
While the FHAA aims to eliminate the housing discrimination
confronting disabled persons,46 the affirmative obligation' it imposes on
landlords to accommodate disabled tenants is not without limitation.48
45 Simring, supra note 1, at 428-29 (quoting UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 114, 118 (1983)
(Clearinghouse No. 81); cf. Kevin J. Zanner, Comment, Dispersion Requirements For The
Siting Of Group Homes: Reconciling New York's Padavan Law With The Fair Housing
Amendments Act Of 1988,44 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 261 (1996) (emphasizing the importance a
House Report placed on treating handicapped persons as individuals).
46 Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 119-27 (enjoining a landlord who adhered to a first
come/first served policy of awarding parking spaces to tenants from refusing to provide a parking
space in the attached garage near the building lobby to a tenant suffering from multiple
sclerosis); Seng, supra note 6, at 5551
47Malkin, supra note 1, at 818-19 (noting that, although the FHAA does not precisely
define 'reasonable accommodations', the "[clanons of statutory construction and notions of
public policy" provide strong support for interpreting section 3604(O(3)(B) as imposing an
affirmative obligation).
"' "[A] 'reasonable accommodation' is one which would not impose an undue hardship
or burden upon the entity making the accommodation and would not undermine the basic
purpose which the requirement seeks to achieve." Roseborough v. Cottonwood Apartments,
No. 94 C 3708, 1994 WL 695516 at *2, (N.D.Ill. 1994) (quoting United States v. Marshall, 787
F.Supp. 872, 878 (W.D.Wis. 1992)). The Roseborough court denied the defendant landlord's
motion to dismiss the complaint in part because whether the landlord owed a duty to the tenant
to relocate the tenant to a lower floor apartment due to the tenant's disability was a question of
fact. However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and the plaintiffs claim that the defendant refused to accommodate them. Id. at *3-4;
see Simring, supra note 1, at 433. In the employment context, an undue hardship may constitute
a disruption to the operation of the business, an imposition of more than minimal costs on the
employer, etc. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE
TO WORKPLACE LAw: EVERYTHING You NEED TO' KNoW ABouT YoUR RIGHTS AS AN
EMPLOYEE OR EMPLOYER 22 (1997). According to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 etseq. (1994), an "undue hardship" necessarily involves "significant
difficulty or expense" in the context of certain factors. These factors are:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed ... (ii) the overall
financial resources of the facility ... the number of persons employed at such
facility, the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial
resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business ... with
respect to the number of its employees.. and (iv) the type of operation or
operations . . including the composition, structure, and functions of the
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There is no requirement that all that is "humanly possible" be done to
accommodate a disabled person, rather, both "cost (to the defendant) and
benefit (to the plaintiff) merit consideration. . . . .4' An accommodation
will not be considered reasonable if, as a result of making the
accommodation, the landlord is either unduly burdened or shoulders an
undue hardship,5" and the principal goal of the requirement at issue is
undermined.51
A reasonable accommodation may prove to be inadequate in
certain situations which would justify the rejection of disabled housing
applicants or the eviction of disabled tenants.5 2 The FHAA will not protect
a disabled person from housing discrimination based on disability where
his tenancy endangers the health or safety of other persons or damages the
property of other persons.53 Neither will the FHAA protect a disabled
workforce of such entity ....
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).49Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425,429, (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Village
of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994)). Although an accommodation to a disabled
tenant must "facilitate [his] ability to function," it must also "survive a cost-benefit balancing that
takes both parties' needs into account". Id. at 431. See also Woodside Village v. Hertzmark,
No. SPH9204-65092, 1993 WL 268293 (Conn. Super.Ct. June 22, 1993). In that case, the
FHAA did not prevent the eviction of a disabled tenant who was unable to comply with general
tenancy rules relating to pets despite the landlord's reasonable accommodations made on his
behalf. Id.
" Some courts adjudicating discrimination claims under the FHAA have chosen to use
the guidelines applicable to employers receiving federal assistance toward determining whether
a landlord would suffer an undue hardship as a result of accommodating a disabled tenant.
Adapted from the employment context to the housing context, these factors are: "1) the overall
size of the housing provider, including the number of residents, number and type of facilities
involved, and the size of its budget; 2) the type of facilities involved, including the composition
and structure of the residences; and 3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed."
Cummings v. Dedham Housing Authority, No. 01-90-0424-1, 1991 WL 442793 at *7
(H.U.D.A.L.J. Nov. 15, 1991).
5' Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384 at *10 (citing Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc. 844
F.Supp. 116, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affid 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995)).
- 52 Simring, supra note 1, at 422.
" 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) (stating that "[niothing in this subsection requires that a
dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical
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person against disability-based discrimination where he either "refuses or
is unable to comply with legitimate tenancy rules that apply to all tenants
.... "4 Nevertheless, where a reasonable accommodation would cure the
risk of harm to people or property posed by the disabled person's tenancy,
or facilitate compliance by the disabled person with the tenancy rules, the
accommodation must be provided.55
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of what constitutes a
"reasonable accommodation" in an educational setting. In Southeastern
Community College v. Davis,56 the Court determined that professional
educational institutions are not prohibited "from imposing physical
qualifications for admission to their clinical training programs."57 The
issue garnered judicial attention when a licensed practical nurse was
refused admission into a nursing program based on her hearing disability.58
damage to the property of others"); see also Simring, supra note 1, at 422 & n.41, 450.
' Simring, supra note 1, at 422.
" Id.; see discussion infra part HII; Zanner, supra note 45, at 261 (concluding that
"barring a showing that a regulation limiting access to housing for individuals with handicaps
is designed to protect safety and health, those individuals should have the right to reside in a
neighborhood of their choice, just as any other person"). See generally John M. Payne, Fair
HousingFor The 1990's: The Fair Housing Amendments Act And The Ward's Cove Case, 18
REAL EST. L.J. 307, 309 (1990) (stating that the FHAA "imposes affirmative obligations on
rental and condominium property owners to make the property physically accessible to the
handicapped tenant").
6 Southeastem Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). This case, which
pre-dated the FHAA, was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In construing section
504, the Court noted that:
by its terms[, it] does not compel educational institutions to disregard the
disabilities of handicapped individuals or to make substantial modifications
in their programs to allow disabled persons to participate. Instead, it
requires only that an 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' not be
excluded from participation in a federally funded program 'solely by reason
of his handicap,' indicating only that mere possession of a handicap is not
a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particular
context.
Id. at 405. The Court determined that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual "is one
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Id. at 406.
57Id. at 400 (deciding a matter of first impression).5 Id. at 402.
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After the applicant interviewed with the school's nursing faculty, and
subsequently consulted with an audiologist, she received a diagnosis and
treatment plan that did not eliminate the need for lipreading.59 Based on
the audiologist's recommendation, the school decided to refuse admission
to the applicant on several grounds. The school believed that her "hearing
disability made it unsafe for her to practice as a nurse[, and that] ... it
would be impossible for [her] to participate safely in the normal clinical
training program, and those modifications that would be necessary to
enable safe participation would prevent her from realizing the benefits of
the program."'" The Court observed that, for the sake of patient safety, the
clinical phase of the school's nursing program required that each
participant possess "the ability to understand, speech without reliance on
lipreading.' " At the same time, the Court noted that, if the applicant were
to participate in the clinical portion of the program, "nothing less than
close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be sufficient to
ensure patient safety .... 1162 Conceiving of that scenario as "a
fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program," the Court'refused
to interpret section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides for
accommodation of the handicapped, as imposing such an extensive
obligation to accommodate.6" The Court emphasized, however, that
SO The applicant was diagnosed as suffering from "a bilateral, sensori-neural hearing
loss" and she was encouraged to change the heating aid that she was then using. Although some
improvement was expected as a result of adhering to the treatment plan, it was believed that lip
reading skills would still be necessary in order for the applicant "to understand normal spoken
speech" and enjoy "effective communication". Id. at 401.
60 Id. at 401-02, 410 (opining that academic courses alone, without the clinical
experience, would not constitute "even a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program
normally gives").
61 Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 407 (adopting the finding of the District Court that "this
ability also is indispensable for many of the functions that a registered nurse performs").
" Id. at 409 (observing that individual instructors would guarantee proper supervision
of all students).
63 Id. at 410. According to the Court, there was uncontroverted evidence that the
applicaht would not have been able to participate fully in the nursing program absent a drastically
lower set ofstandards. The Court concluded that "[s]ection 504 imposes no requirement upon
an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to
accommodate a handicapped person." Id. at 413.
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"situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might
become unreasonable and discriminatory," and that a careful analysis of
each particular case remained necessary.6 4
Since that ground breaking decision in 1979, the notion of
"reasonable accommodation" has evolved. Codification in the FHAA, and
the ensuing litigation, has helped not only to refine the meaning of the
concept, but has also changed the lives of disabled persons on the most
basic of levels. The influence of the "reasonable accommodation"
provision may be seen, for example, in a variety of general tenancy rules.
A. "No Pets" Policies
Disabled tenants have also litigated the concept of "reasonable
accommodation" under the FHAA with respect to "no pets" policies in
residential rental. properties.6" Typically, disabled tenants insist that they
should be permitted to keep pets in their residences, where pets are
unilaterally prohibited, because pets are medically necessary to their well-
being and enable them to have full use and enjoyment of their dwellings.66
64 Id. at 412-13. The Court broadly commented further that "an insistence on
continuing past requirements and practices" may be discrimination against the handicapped, and
that "[t]echnological advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the
handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employment" without necessarily
placing an undue burden on the state. Id. at 412.
6See, e.g., Bronk, 54 F.3d 425 (balancing a landlord's interest in enforcing a no-pets
policy with a deaf individual's need for a hearing dog and concluding that allowing the disabled
tenant to keep a hearing dog constitutes a "reasonable accommodation"); Exelberth v. Riverbay
Corp., No. 02-93-0320-1, 1994 WL 497536 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Sept. 8, 1994) (holding that
allowing a mentally disabled person to keep a dog in her apartment despite the landlord's no-pets
policy constitutes a 'reasonable accommodation"); Woodside Village v. Hertzmark, No.
SPH9204-65092, 1993 WL 268293 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 22, 1993) (discussing whether laws
that prohibit discrimination in housing would support the eviction of a disabled individual 'who
violated a no-pets policy).
' See, e.g.,Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429 & n.6 (reasoning that the situation of a deaf resident
who wishes to keep a hearing dog in a building with a no-pets policy is analogous to the situation
of a blind applicant for rental housing who wishes to keep her seeing eye dog in a building with
a no-pets policy, which was envisioned by the regulations instituting the provisions of the FHAA,
24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (1993), promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
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The object of their litigation is a waiver or exemption from their landlords
"no pets" policies applicable to all tenants, in order that they be able to
enjoy their dwellings to the same extent as non-disabled tenants by being
permitted to live with their pets.67 Whether the tenants' particular
disabilities are characterized by physical or mental impairments, the
"reasonable accommodation" clause has been invoked to redress the
discrimination perpetrated against them by "no-pets" policies.
Mentally disabled tenants have initiated considerable litigation
with respect to "no pets" policies.68 In Exelberth v. Riverbay Corp.,69 a
disabled tenant70 prevailed against her landlord's effort to evict her for her
violation of the "no-pets" policy in her apartment building, and she was
ultimately permitted to keep her dog in her apartment despite the
landlord's prohibition against pets.7 The tenant had defied the landlord's
order that she remove the dog from her apartment because she claimed to
Development); Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536 at *6 (significantly noting that the landlord
previously had allowed a blind resident to keep her seeing eye dog in her apartment in the same
building).
67Bronk, 54 F.3d at 428-30; Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536 at * 1; Woodside Village,
1993 WL 268293 at *3.68Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536 at *6; Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293 at *1.
69 1994 WL 497536 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Sept. 8, 1994).
0 The tenant has "a schizoid personality disorder... characterized by difficulty in
relations with people, difficulty becoming involved with other people, and ... a depressive
disorder... characterized by complete loss of pleasure in life, wish to die, and very low self-
esteem." Id. at *4. She also "angers easily and has narcissistic tendencies." Id.
71 Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536 at *12-14. The tenant had inadvertently acquired a
dog which she claimed to have intended to promptly give away, but was subsequently unable
to do so. Id. at *2. After developing an attachment to it, she sought and received legal advice
from the American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) about how to
overcome the prohibition in her occupancy agreement relating to pets. Id. Shortly thereafter, the
landlord notified the tenant that the dog had to be removed from the dwelling. Id. As a result of
the tenant's refusal to remove the dog from her apartment, the landlord levied a fine for her
violation of the occupancy agreement. Id. Although the tenant paid the fine, the landlord refused
to accept the tenant's subsequent monthly rent payments and instituted eviction proceedings
against her. Id. Those proceedings resulted in an order of eviction which was later affirmed. Id.
The landlord was subsequently enjoined from enforcing the eviction order, and directed to allow
the tenant to live with the dog in her apartment. Id. at 12-13.
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derive a substantial emotional benefit from having it in her home.72 After
hearing expert testimony on the tenant's mental condition, the court found
that "[tihe dog's presence [was] soothing [to her] in a way that she could
never be soothed by other people, even her therapists or the medications
she would get."73  The court emphasized the "special benefit" that the
tenant derived from having the dog, as compared with the enjoyment that
dogs generally bestow upon their owners, as a compelling reason for
requiring the accommodation.74 In addition, the court noted that the
integrity of the landlord's "no pets" policy would not be compromised
because "only the narrow group of people whose disability requires the
companionship of a pet would be permitted to harbor such pets."75
Finding that the landlord would not be unduly burdened by making the
accommodation for the tenant, and that the accommodation was itself
reasonable, the court ordered the landlord to allow the tenant to keep the
dog.
76
Physically disabled tenants have litigated "no pets" policies with
equal vigor.77 In Bronk v. Ineichen," two profoundly deaf women sued
2 Id. at *2. The tenant first revealed the therapeutic nature of the dog's presence to
her attorney during the eviction proceeding, although the issue of her disability was not then
raised. According to the trial record, she "look[s] forward to waking up and feeding her dog",
id. at *4, and "[she] depends on [it] 'for good feelings."' Id. at *5.
"Id. at *4 (noting that the canine companionship would be more effective in treating
some symptoms of the tenant's mental condition than the traditional means, such as
combinations of psychotherapy and medication).
'4Id. at *9 (crediting the testimony of the tenant's psychiatrist that living with the dog
is a medical necessity for the tenant's mental state).
"Id. The court observed that the tenant's "dog enables her to experience the ordinary
feelings enjoyed by persons not otherwise afflicted with her disability." Id. The court also
likened the situation to one in which a blind resident lives with a seeing eye dog, because for
both, it is the animal that enables the disabled resident to enjoy the dwelling to the same extent
as non-disabled persons. Id. (referring to regulations promulgated by HUJD, 24 C.F.R. §
100.204(b) (1993)).
76 Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536 at *9. The court stated that "purely speculative
assertions of the potential costs of future accommodations have no bearing on the reasonableness
of the accommodation for [the tenant]." Id. The court also noted the absence of any evidence
suggesting that other tenants objected to the dog's presence. Id.
7 See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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their landlord when he refused to allow them to keep a dog in their
apartment.79 The issue of whether the dog was a "hearing dog"8 ° was hotly
contested." The court suggested that had the parties stipulated that the
dog "provid[ed] needed assistance" to the tenants, the case might have
been "susceptible to determination as a matter of law."82 It was the court's
belief that "[b]alanced against a landlord's economic or aesthetic concerns
as expressed in a no-pets policy, a deaf individual's need for the
accommodation afforded by a hearing dog is ... per se reasonable within
the meaning of the statute."83 However, the existence of factual issues
pertaining to the dog's skill level,84 in addition to problematic jury
instructions, necessitated a new trial.85
Despite its seemingly broad scope, however, the FHAA is not
intended to provide disabled tenants with legal protection and redress for
every requested accommodation that is denied by the landlord.86 It is only
78 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995).
791 Id. at 426-27.
' "A bhearing dog is trained to assist deaf individuals in their daily activities. The skills
of such dogs can vary; [the deaf tenants' dog] allegedly was trained to alert his owners to the
ringing of the doorbell, telephone or smoke alarm, and to carry notes." Bronk, 54 F.3d at 427
n.4 (citing plaintiffs brief at 3).
"1 The brother of one of the deaf tenants had allegedly taught the dog some skills that
would help deaf persons, although he had no experience in training hearing dogs. Id. at 428.
There was no evidence that the dog had ever received any professional schooling or training for
assisting deaf persons. Id.
82 Id. at 429.
'Id. See also id. at 429 n.6 (analogizing to a situation in which a blind person seeks
to live with a seeing eye dog in a building in which the landlord does not allow pets).
'Id. at 429 n.6 (noting the distinction that must be drawn between "mere house pets"
and "hearing dogs" for determining the applicability of the regulations promulgated by HUD
instituting the FHAA, 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (1993)).
"Bronk, 54 F.3d at 427. The court vacated the jury's verdict for the disabled tenants
because of its "concern[] that the tendered jury instructions may have confused jury members
by unnecessarily conflating local, state, and federal law." Id. Although the court found that there
was "ample evidence to support the determination of no liability" [on the part of the landlord],
the court nevertheless remanded to the lower court for a new trial. Id.
'See generally Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293. Although the accommodation
made by the landlord in Woodside was deemed to be reasonable, the accommodation did not
adequately enable the tenant to comply with the general tenancy rules. Id. at 5. Because the
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those accommodations that are reasonably necessary to enable the disabled
tenant to use and to enjoy his dwelling as if he were not disabled, and do
not impose an undue burden on the landlord, that will be recognized and
provided for under the FHAA 7 It is well-settled that "[t]he need for the
accommodation must arise out of the person's handicap and not be a
function of personal preference or convenience.""
Protection afforded to disabled tenants under the FHAA is not
unlimited either. Where a landlord makes a reasonable accommodation
to a disabled tenant, and the tenant's disability prevents his compliance
with the legitimate tenancy rules that apply to all tenants despite the
accommodation, the federal anti-discrimination protection will not be
available.8 9
In Woodside Village v. Hertzmark,9 ° the FHAA did not prohibit
the eviction of a disabled tenant9 for his violation of the landlord's pet
policy.' Although the landlord permitted pets in the apartment building,
there were certain conditions on such pet ownership, including specified
areas for walking dogs and instructions on the proper method for waste
disposal.93 Soon after the tenant began living in the apartment with his
landlord did not fail to make a reasonable accommodation, the FHAA did not prevent the
eviction of the tenant. Id. at 6. The FHAA requires only that an accommodation, where
necessary, be reasonable. Id. at 3. A landlord is never required to do more than is reasonable,
even though in some circumstances, nothing less than an extraordinary effort might be necessary
to help a tenant to overcome a disability. Id. at 4.
87 Guard v. Ocean Sands, Inc., No. 04-90-0231-1, 1993 WL 343530 at *10
(H.U.D.A.L.J. Sept. 3, 1993).
88 Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293 at *5.
9 Simring, supra note 1, at 422 (explaining that a tenant's refusal or inability to
comply with legitimate tenancy rules that apply to all tenants will justify that tenant's eviction);
see supra notes 52, 54-55, and accompanying text.
90 Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293.
" The tenant was "a chronic schizophrenic" with "severe learning disabilities". Id. at
*1. He suffered from poor judgment and "impaired" social skills as a result of his condition. Id.
His therapist stated that he was only "marginally capable of independent living." Id.
92Id. at *6.
93 d. at *2. With respect to dog walking, the landlord's policy provided that "[d]ogs
will be walked and curbed along the street gutter" and that "[d]ogs cannot be walked on the
sidewalk areas in front of any building." Id. With respect to waste disposal, "[d]og owners must
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dog, his problems with the dog became apparent.9 4  The landlord
responded to the complaints of other tenants about the disabled tenant and
his dog by assigning "its on-site social worker [to] arrange[] for a dog
trainer to work with the [disabled tenant]."95 This endeavor proved to be
futile.96 Subsequently, the landlord commenced eviction proceedings
against the disabled tenant.97 Unlike the other cases in which the litigation
involved the keeping of pets by disabled tenants in buildings where pets
were prohibited,9" this litigation arose because of the tenant's "inability to
comply" with the policy permitting pets, rather than his mere possession
of one.99 The court declared that the tenant's inability, as a result of his
mental condition, "to take advantage of' the landlord's prior "reasonable
efforts to accommodate" him did not make those accommodations
"unreasonable."°°
... use a pooper scooper' to clean up behind their pet and properly dispose of all waste/excrement
in any areas caused by their pet." Id. In addition, the landlord required that "[w]aste materials
must be disposed of in sealed plastic bags and placed in the dumpster." Id.
' Id. The court noted that tenant experienced "difficulty training and managing his
dog." Id. Other tenants complained of hearing protracted "barking and whining" when the dog
was left in the apartment for lengthy periods. Id. There were infrequent episodes in which the
dog would "urinate or defecate in the common areas of the building", including the sidewalk and
the parking lot. Id. Other tenants also "observed [the tenant] disciplining the dog
inappropriately by dragging him with an excessively tight collar." Id.
9' Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293, at *2. In a further effort to help the disabled
tenant comply with the tenancy rules relating to pets, the social worker "purchased a 'pooper
scooper' for him and offered to establish a schedule of supervised walks" for him and the dog.
Id.
96 Id. Even after the landlord's efforts on the disabled tenant's behalf, many elderly
tenants continued to complain to the landlord about fearing for their safety, and the disruptive
presence of the tenant and his dog. Id.
" Id. Because the landlord received federal funds toward the operation of the
apartment building, the landlord was required to, and did, comply with the procedures governing
termination actions. Id.
9 See, e.g., Exelberth, 1994 WL 497536; Bronk, 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995).
9 Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293 at *5.
"' Id. at 5-6. The court determined that the landlord's actions toward assisting the
disabled tenant, prior to the commencement of eviction proceedings, constituted "reasonable
efforts to accommodate" under the FHAA. Id. at *6.
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B. Parking Policies
The context of the availability of parking spaces for disabled
residents of apartment complexes provides another meaningful backdrop
for examining the meaning of the notion of reasonable accommodation
under the FHAA. °' Tenants with ambulatory difficulties may have special
needs, and as a consequence, their lifestyles may be negatively affected
when their abilities to find appropriate parking spaces for their
automobiles are restricted. Often, both the quality and quantity of
available parking spaces qualifies as an essential element in their use and
enjoyment of their dwellings.102
With respect to parking, a reasonable accommodation of a
physically disabled tenant may be, in the appropriate circumstance, the
'SeeShapirov. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 116, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1994),
affd, 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995) (declaring that a landlord could not refuse to provide a disabled
tenant, who suffered from multiple sclerosis and resulting ambulatory difficulty, with a parking
space in the garage of her apartment building, even though the landlord would be required to
deviate from its strict adherence to a first come/first served policy of awarding parking spaces
to tenants); Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384 at * 18 (requiring that a landlord designate a parking
space for the exclusive use of a disabled tenant, who suffered from multiple sclerosis, even
though the landlord had a policy of not providing designated parking spaces for individual
tenants).
102 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (1993). HUD's regulation for implementing the FHAA's
'reasonable accommodation' requirements contains the following example of a 'reasonable
accommodation' in which a disabled tenant needs a particular parking space:
(b) Progress Gardens is a 300 unit apartment complex with 450 parking
spaces which are available to tenants and guests of Progress Gardens on a
first come first served basis. John applies for housing in Prospect Gardens.
John is mobility impaired and is unable to walk more than a short distance
and therefore requests that a parking space near his unit be reserved for
him so he will not have to walk very far to get to his apartment. It is a
violation of § 100.204 for the owner or manager of Progress Gardens to
refuse to make this accommodation. Without a reserved space, John might
be unable to live in Progress Gardens at all or, when he has to park in a
space far from his unit, might have difficulty getting from his car to his
apartment unit. The accommodation therefore is necessary to afford John
an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The accommodation is
reasonable because it is feasible and practical under the circumstances.
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creation of an exception to a policy generally applicable to all tenants in
favor of the physically disabled tenant." 3 In Shapiro v. Cadman Towers,
Inc. a," a co-operative housing corporation was enjoined from refusing to
provide a tenant suffering from multiple sclerosis with a parking space.0 5
The landlord implemented and strictly adhered to a first come/first served
policy of awarding parking spaces to tenants." 6 Although the disabled
tenant had informed the landlord about her disability.0 7 and accompanying
need for a proximate parking space prior to, upon, and shortly after
moving into the apartment, all of her requests for a parking space were
denied.' The landlord declined to honor the disabled tenant's application
for a parking space based on its concern for "maintaining the integrity of
the waiting lists."'0 9 The court recognized the effect that an individual's
'o' See Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 127; see also Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384' at *14.
" Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 116.
1 5Id. at 127.
'06 Id. at 120. The housing co-operative consists of two nearly adjacent apartment
buildings, each with an underground garage, and the number of apartments is more than twice
that of the number of spaces in the garages. Id. Because of the great differential between the
numbers of apartment units and parking spaces, the landlord adopted a first come/first served
policy for awarding parking spaces to tenants. Id. at 119-20. The landlord believed that
permitting any kind of exception to the policy for awarding parking spaces would call into
question the legitimacy of the policy. Id. at 121. Prior to the this litigation, however, several
exceptions had been made to the policy. These included several residents having the use of
multiple parking spaces, in addition to the reservation of spaces for building employees as an
element of their employment compensation. Id. at 120.
107 "Multiple sclerosis is a chronic, progressive disease of the central nervous system,
which primarily affects young women. The cause of multiple sclerosis and its cure remain
unknown. Its symptoms include physical weakness, difficulty in walking, loss of balance and
coordination, visual disturbance, fatigue, loss of stamina and severe headaches." Id. at 118. In
addition to these symptoms, the tenant also suffered "a related neurogenic bladder disorder"
which caused her to have "difficulty emptying her bladder" and sometimes "rendered [her]
incontinent." Id.
"Id. at 120-21. Moreover, the landlord then refused to add the tenant's name to the
existing waiting list for the assignment of parking spaces, which behavior the tenant complained
was retaliatory discrimination. Id. at 127 n.1 1.
'09 Shapiro, 844 F. Supp. at 121. The court observed that the landlord seemed
"suspicious" of the existence of the tenant's disability. Id. This inference was based on the
landlord's failure either to order a physical examination of the tenant or request the medical
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disability often has on his daily life,"' particularly the way in which those
things that non-disabled persons view as "convenience[s]" are, for the
handicapped, "instrumental to living as close to normal lives as
possible.""' Although the court was unwilling to determine the specific
way in which the landlord should accommodate the disabled tenant," 2 it
did imply that modification of the policy for awarding parking spaces
would be the likely result.'
Reasonable accommodation may also involve substantial
modifications to existing policies, or even the creation and implementation
of new policies which are beneficial to the disabled tenant with respect to
the particular disability, so long as making such accommodation is not
oppressive to the landlord." 4 In Rusinov v. Jankowski Lee & Associates," 5
a tenant suffering from multiple sclerosis was refused an assigned parking
space despite his disability because of the landlord's adherence to a first
history of the tenant, as well as testimony from several witnesses that the tenant did not appear
to walk with any noticeable difficulty. Id. The court recognized, however, that the "onset",
"frequency" and "severity" of the symptoms, of multiple sclerosis are often unpredictable. Id.
at 118.
... In this case, as a result of not having a parking space in the garage, the disabled
tenant was forced to park on the streets in her neighborhood. Id. at 119. Because the tenant's
apartment building was located near a commercial area, she had to "compete" with both
residents and shoppers for parking spaces. Id. In addition, because as a handicapped individual,
she was exempt from the local parking rules, she disrupted street cleaning schedules on
residential streets when she parked there, and encountered hostility from affected resident
property owners. Id.
n. Id. at 126. The court reasoned that, while the preferences of both the handicapped
and the non-handicapped for parking spaces are often indistinguishable, it is the existence of a
handicap which creates the distinction between an "acute need (and not simple desire) for the
[parking] spots." Id.
..2 Id. at 127 (expressing concern that any such finding would "be an unnecessary
judicial intrusion into the affairs of a private entity.").
1 3 Id. (declaring that the landlord's rigid adherence to its policy of awarding parking
spaces is illustrative of the mindset sought to be eliminated by the enactment of the "reasonable
accommodations" provision of the FHAA).
"
4 See Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 127; see also Rusinov, 1995-WL 399384 at *14.
.. 1995 WL 399384 (H.U.D.A.L.J. June 30, 1995).
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come/first served parking policy." 6 In addition to the physical limitations
of his handicap," 7 he was plagued by mental and psychological problems
associated with the treatment of his multiple sclerosis." 8  Unlike the
situation in Shapiro, where the disabled tenant was excluded from the
parking spaces provided by the landlord, this disabled tenant was entitled
to use the parking spaces provided by the landlord. As in Shapiro, his
disability necessitated that he park close to his apartment. "9 As a result of
his efforts to live a normal and independent life,"2O he often faced a dire
situation when he returned home at night, because at that time of day,
"there [were] frequently no available handicapped parking spaces or other
"' The apartment complex consists of two buildings and several parking lots in which
only tenants are permitted to park. Id. at *3-4. The number of parking spaces is slightly larger
than the number of tenants registered to park. Id. at *4. There were fewer than ten parking
spaces specifically designated as handicapped spots to accommodate almost thirty residents Who
were entitled to handicapped parking privileges. Id. According to the rules of the apartment
complex, the parking policy has always been administered on a first come/first served basis. Id.
"
71d, at *1-2. The tenant suffers from two principal afflictions, multiple sclerosis, and
asceptic necrosis, which he developed as a result of cortisone treatments that he had received for
the multiple sclerosis. Id. at *2. The tenanfsjoints are slowly deteriorating, and he suffers much
pain as a consequence. Id. He also has been diagnosed with scoliosis, which will probably
necessitate corrective surgery. Id. Due to the multiple sclerosis, the tenant suffers from fatigue
syndrome, which results in substantial fluctuations in his energy level in a given day. Id.
118 Id. at *3. The tenant's multiple sclerosis has spawned various psychological
complications from the medications used in his treatment, such as "depression, anxiety, panic
attacks, out-of-body experiences, and somatic delusions bordering on psychosis." Id. The tenant
is young, and he "is embarrassed by his condition" because it causes "him to appear disabled to
other people." Id.
119 Id. at *5. Most non-disabled persons prefer to park as close as possible to their
destination. Id. Like most people, he also prefers to park as close as possible to his apartment.
Id. But unlike those people, the difficulty he experiences in walking long distances, and his
problems with stamina and balance, dictate that he minimize the extent of his walking activities.
Besides proximity, though, there is also a second consideration of ample space. Id. As a result
of his condition, in order to get out of his automobile, "he must open the door fully and place
both legs on the ground at the same time to maintain his balance." Id.
120 Rusinov, WL 399384 at *3. The tenant tries, consistent with his doctor's
instructions, "to keep as active as possible." Id. As part of his therapy, he drives his car in order
to "expand[] his vistas and his overall feeling of normality." Id. He often drives to visit his
parents, who live approximately twenty miles away, and arrives home late in the evening. Id.
at *5.
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spaces close to the entrance to his building.' ' 121 Consequently, his ability
to live independently was severely impaired, 122 and he experienced
physical and mental distress." The disabled tenant's repeated requests for
either the designation of additional handicapped parking spots, or in the
alternative, a parking spot designated for his exclusive use, were flatly
denied. 124  The trial record contained considerable medical evidence
attesting to his impaired physical and mental condition, and the manner in
which the parking problem interfered with his enjoyment of his
apartment. 25  In determining the reasonableness of the requested
accommodation, 126 the court declared that the landlord would be forced
to incur only insignificant costs 27 by assigning and maintaining a parking
121 Id. at *5.
'DId. at *8. Rather than face the parking problems, the disabled tenant would avoid
the situation by staying with his parents at their home. Id. at 5. The difficult parking situation
also interfered with other activities such as "shopping and seeing his doctors." Id. at *12.
"Id. at *5-6. As a result of not being able to find adequate parking, that is, spaces
that are both near and large, the disabled tenant would be forced to park in the farthest corner
of the parking lot where the spaces are available and large. Id. at *5. During one such time, he
fell on ice and had to "pull himself up by using his cane," which left him "exhausted" and
"nervous." Id.
"I1d. at *6. The court noted that the landlord never conducted any inquiry into the
extent to which the tenant's condition affected his mobility, "nor did [the landlord] attempt to
investigate [his] need for an individualized space prior to rejecting his request". Id. at *7.
Although the landlord increased the number of parking spots specifically designated for
handicapped individuals during the course of this litigation, the landlord was reluctant to assign
a parking space restricted for the tenant's own use. This policy against assigning parking spots
to individual tenants apparently arose out of the landlord's concern about "hav[ing] to create an
'assigned only' parking lot" as a result of providing the tenant with his own parking space. Id.
2 Rusinov, WL 399384 at *1-3. The bulk of the medical evidence consisted of the
testimony of the tenant's neurologist, who had been treating the tenant for several years prior to
the commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 1.
126 The court considered the following factors: "1) the overall size of the housing
provider, including the number of residents, number and type of facilities involved, and the size
of its budget; 2) the type of facilities involved, including the composition and structure of the
residences; and 3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed." Id. at * 12; see supra note
50.
271d. at *13. The court rejected the landlord's argument that "severe administrative
and enforcement costs" would be incurred, such as "the potential difficulties of setting up and
subsequently policing [the tenants] parking space." Id. In the court's view, the only certain cost
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space for the disabled tenant's exclusive use. The landlord's refusal to
honor the disabled tenant's request for an assigned parking space was
deemed to be a failure to make a reasonable accommodation, in violation
of section 3604(f)(3)(B) of the FHAA.'28
Making a reasonable accommodation for a physically disabled
tenant might not necessarily involve the abrogation of a general policy, or
even the modification of rules for tenants who are not similarly physically
limited.'29 Merely elevating the "individualized needs" of the particular
disabled tenant over the desires of other tenants who do not need the
accommodation might be sufficient under the FHAA.1
30
In Cummings v. Dedham Housing Authority,13' a tenant who
suffered from "chronic heart disease and severe peripheral vascular
disease" 131 successfully sued his landlord because his requests for an
assigned parking space were denied.' The landlord refused to designate
a parking space for the disabled tenant's exclusive ise because it believed
that to do so "would set a 'damaging precedent," 3 .4 and would cause non-
handicapped tenants to be deprived of parking spaces. 135 The trial record
amply detailed the tenant's severely impaired ability to walk, 136 as well as
the difficulty he encountered in finding an available parking space close to
would be that "of installing a sign." Id. Moreover, "an efficient system for policing the parking
lots and issuing citations" [when necessary]" was already in place at the apartment complex. Id.
128 Id. at *14. The court also declared that the landlord had violated 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(2) (1994) as well as 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.202(b) and 100.204 (1993). Id.
"'Cummings v. Dedham Housing Authority, No. 01-90-0424-1, 1991 442793 at *8
(H.U.D.A.L.J. Nov. 15, 1991).
1
30 
Id.
"' 1991 WL 442793 at *8.
132 Id. at *2.
133 Id. at *13.
134 Id. at *8.
135 Id.
136 Cummings, 1991 WL 442793 at *2. He was issued handicap license plates by the
State of Massachusetts more than two and one-half years after moving into his apartment. Id.
He can walk "5 yards without rest and 10 yards with intermittent rest." Id. If he walks for
greater distances, "he experiences leg and chest pain ... and feels 'fuzzyheaded."' Id.
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his apartment.137 The court recognized the way in which the parking
problem was negatively affecting the disabled tenant's life." 8 By making
the accommodation, the court determined that the landlord would incur
only minimal cost,'39 and its first come/first served parking policy would
not be "compromise[d].' ' 14' Therefore, the court found that the landlord
had violated the FHAA by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation
for the disabled tenant,'4' and ordered that the landlord designate a parking
space close to his apartment for the tenant's sole use.
142
C. General Fees
Fees generally applicable to all tenants may be subject to scrutiny
under the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the FHAA with respect
137 Id. at *3. Although the landlord had increased the number of handicap parking
spaces in the lot from one to three, those three spots were often occupied for "lengthy periods"
by other tenants with handicap license plates. Id. When the handicap spaces were unavailable,
the disabled tenant "park[ed] illegally on a service road" where his car was subject to ticketing
and towing. Id.
138 Id. at *4. Due to the parking problem, the disabled tenant stopped making visits
to his family, and severely limited his excursions, except for those biweekly trips related to his
employment. Id. Furthermore, physical pain, emotional distress, embarrassment and loss of
sleep were all attributed to the parking situation. Id.
139 Id. at *8. The cost of installing a sign to designate that the parking space was
reserved for the disabled tenant's exclusive use was $50.00. Id.
140 Id. "Assigning a parking space to [him] merely involves elevating [his]
individualized needs as a handicapped person over the desires of other tenants who do not need
the accommodation." Id. The court explained that he "is a member of a 'narrow group' for
whom a limited exception to the 'first come, first served' parking rule could be made without
eliminating the application of the rule to those who do not fall within that narrow exception."
Id.
"' Cummings, 1991 WL 442793 at *8. The court found that the landlord had
violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(2) and 3604(f)(3)(b) (1994), and 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.202(b) and
100.204 (1993).
142 Id. at *13. The parking space would either be the space nearest to the tenant's
apartment, or at his option, one of the handicapped spaces. The court also declared that, if the
tenant relocated to another apartment within the apartment complex, then the landlord would
be required to reassign to the tenant, for his exclusive use, the parking space nearest to the new
apartment. Id.
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to disabled tenants.'43 In United States v. California Mobile Home Park
Management Co.,' 4 the court stated that the obligation to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled tenants may dictate that landlords
incur some financial cost as a result of accommodating those tenants.' 45
In that case, a tenant sued her landlord claiming that the imposition of fees
for the presence of long-term guests and guest parking constituted a failure
to reasonably accommodate disabled tenants. 146 The tenant's daughter
suffered from a respiratory disease which required the care of a home
health care aide, and the landlord's fee policy was thereby implicated.
1417
Despite the tenant's requests to be exempt from paying the fees, the
landlord insisted on strict adherence to its policy. 4 ' Because of the
procedural posture of the case, the court did not render its decision on the
merits. 1"' Nevertheless, the court recited the "generous spirit" with which
the FHAA ought to be construed, 5 ° and noted that the law was
143 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
144 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
141 Id. at 1414 (determining that "fees generally applicable" may well be within the
reach of the FHAA's reasonable accommodation provision). The decision rendered by the
Circuit Court reversed the District Court's dismissal of the action, and ordered the case remanded
to the District Court. Id. at 1418.
146 Id. at 1415. The landlord "charg[ed] residents a fee of $1.50 per day for the
presence of long-term guests and $25.00 per month for guest parking." Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. As a result, the tenant paid $175.00, which represented fees assessed during
a period of 21 months. Id.
"4 The court noted, however, that while residential fees that affect handicapped and
non-handicapped residents with equal force do not trigger the FHAA, "those [fees] with unequal
impact, imposed in return for permission to engage in conduct that, under the FHAA, a landlord
is required to permit" may trigger judicial review. California Mobile Home, 29 F.3d at 1417.
The court also observed the distinction between an accommodation that would afford a disabled
person an equal opportunity, and one that would create in the disabled tenant a preferential
position in relation to other tenants without the accommodation. Id. at 1418 & n.4.
50 Id. at 1416 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211,
212 (1972) for the proposition that the FHA should be construed generously in order to achieve
a critically significant Congressional policy).
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"concerned with facially neutral rules of all types." 5' Guided by Congress'
anticipation that landlords might have to bear some financial burdens as
part of reasonably accommodating disabled tenants, the court was not
persuaded by the landlord's attempt "to distinguish accommodations that
have a financial cost from other accommodations. ... ,'S2 This decision
is significant because it appears to extend the reach of the FHAA to
another type of landlord conduct that may discriminate against disabled
persons, and may offer additional protection of the rights of those persons.
The FHAA has also been termed broad enough to encompass
actions by disabled tenants against their former landlords for fees
ordinarily accruing under terminated leases. In Samuelson v. Mid-Atlantic
Realty Co., Inc.,' the court adjudicated a motion to dismiss filed by the
landlord in favor of the disabled tenant, and allowed the lawsuit to
proceed. A disabled tenant terminated his apartment lease prematurely
because his mental disability interfered with his ability to live
independently to the extent that his safety was placed at risk.'54 The tenant
was hospitalized for his condition almost immediately after taking up
residence in the new apartment,' 5 and he was forced to vacate the
premises based upon his psychiatrist's recommendation.'56 Although his
' Id. at 1417 (citing the legislative history of the FHAA, where Congress declared
that enforcing or applying otherwise neutral rules against disabled persons that have the effect
of making housing unavailable to those persons is prohibited). Id. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711,
at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
... Id. at 1416. The court concluded that, unlike section 3604(f)(3)(A), which
requires that a landlord allow 'reasonable modifications' to dwellings where the associated costs
are bome by the tenant, section 3604(f)(3)(B) does not state that tenants must shoulder any cost
whatsoever. Id. at 1416 n.1.
"' Samuelson v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Co., Inc., 947 F.Supp. 756 (D.Del. 1996).
114 Id. at 758. The only information provided by the court relating to the tenant's
medical disability was that "he suffer[ed] from an undisclosed, apparently crippling, mental
impairment," which prevented him from working, and entitled him to social security benefits.
Id.
...Id. The one-year apartment lease began on April 25, 1995. The tenant moved in
to the apartment that same day but was hospitalized three days later from April 28 through May
15, 1995. Id.
156 Id. The tenant's psychiatrist concluded that the tenant's safety would have been
jeopardized by continued residence in the apartment. Id.
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tenancy lasted for approximately three months,' the landlord sought the
whole of the rental payments due under the year long lease."5 8 The
landlord also wanted to retain the security deposit and charge the tenant
various fees for cleaning and reletting the apartment to a new tenant. 159
Because of the procedural posture of the case, 6' the court was not
positioned to resolve the case on the merits. Nevertheless, the court's
refusal to grant the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint bodes well
for an expansive application of the FHAA. Significantly, the court
rejected the landlord's argument that no failure to reasonably
accommodate occurred by the imposition of the fees because the tenant
vacated the apartment voluntarily, and the fees did not accrue until a
month after the tenant's ceased living in the apartment. 6' Indeed, the
court's decision to allow the case to proceed acknowledges that a refusal
to make a reasonable accommodation may occur where a landlord
"impose[s] exorbitant lease termination fees on only disabled tenants"
subsequent to the disabled tenant's vacation of the apartment. '62 Of critical
importance was the court's interpretation of the protection of the FHAA
as extending beyond !'temporal limitations" in order to discourage
S Id. The tenant vacated the apartment on July 31, 1995. Id.
S Samuelson, 947 F.Supp. at 758. The landlord claimed that the tenant owed it
$4,307.35, representing rental payments from August, 1995 through April, 1996, fees for
cleaning, and reletting. Id.
'
59Id. The tenant had previously paid the landlord $106.00 as a security deposit, and
upon request for its return, the landlord "ic[ily]" refused. Id. at 758. Included in the bill
presented to the tenant were fees in the amounts of $65.00 for cleaning, $197.50 for reletting,
$70.50 for labor to re-rent the unit, $90.00 for shampooing the carpet, and $14.35 for parts to
renovate the apartment. Id. at 758 n. 2.
" The court adjudicated the landlord's motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
Id. at 758.
'"' Id. at 760.
62Id. at 762. The court noted the similarity of these facts to the situation presented
by United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management Co. Inc., 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir.
1994), particularly to the way in which "generally applicable fees ... can interfere with the use
and enjoyment of housing by the handicapped." Id. at 761.
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discrimination against disabled tenants.163
IV. CONCLUSION
"The right to 'establish a home' is an essential part of the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 64  Disabled persons are
certainly entitled not. only to exercise this constitutional right, but to
exercise it to the same extent as non-disabled persons. '65 Our society's
history of discrininating against disabled persons based on unsubstantiated
and unfounded fears about their disabilities, however, has often succeeded
in preventing such persons from living among us in our communities. 66
The FHAA is a bold initiative by our national government to restrict
discriminatory practices against disabled persons in the area of housing.67
Although "[p]rejudice, once let loose, is not easily cabined 16" this federal
163 Samuelson, 947 F.Supp. at 762. The court opined that distinguishing between
actions occurring prior to the execution of a lease agreement, and actions occurring subsequent
to the contract's execution where premature termination is "imminent", was a "breathtaking
display of formalism" by the landlord. Id. The court also commented that, by permitting a
"temporal limitation" to be read into the FHAA, the law would be subject to routine
circumvention and thereby rendered "toothless." Id.
' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the right to choose and pursue a
given legitimate vocation is among those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
165 See Seng, supra note 6, at 542 & n.4 (noting that the legislative history of the
FHAA and the development of fair housing law support the notion that handicapped persons are
entitled to the same protections as other classes of persons).
'6See Kanter, supra note 1, at 933-34; see generally, Soper, supra note 29, at 1033.
167 See Kanter, supra note 1, at 933-34; see Joseph D. Rich, Enforcement of the Fair
HousingAct, As Amended, By the Department of Justice, 46 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1349 (1991)
(arguing that the enforcement of the FHAA by the Department of Justice demonstrates that the
FHAA has invigorated the FHA); see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
" City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (referring to University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,395 (1978).
[D]iscrimination against the handicapped often begins with the thought
that she looks just like me-that she's normal-when in fact the handicapped
person is'in some significant respect different. Prejudice, it bears recalling,
includes not just mistreating another because of the diffeience of her
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legislation nevertheless represents a promise for equality by attempting to
combat this form of invidious discrimination. 169 This law affords disabled
persons the opportunity to enjoy their residences to the same degree that
non-disabled persons do, and, at the same time, provides a broader choice
for disabled persons regarding where they may establish their homes. 7°
For the first time in history, disabled persons have an opportunity
to achieve housing equality because of the concept of reasonable
accommodation. 7' The FHAA promises to lessen the effect of a disability
on a disabled person, at least with respect to availability and enjoyment of
housing. Providing parking spaces, permitting medically necessary pets
in residences and waiving generally applicable fees, are all ways in which
the FHAA has already helped to protect the constitutional rights
guaranteed to disabled persons with respect to housing.'72
While housing discrimination based on handicap unfortunately
continues to exist today, 173 the FHAA represents a significant departure
from our past tradition of sanctioning such practice. 174 Providing legal
outward appearance but also assuming others are the same because of their
appearance, when they are not.
Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 121.
169 See Soper, supra note 29, at 1065; cf., Malkin supra note 1, at 802 ("In a world
without the FHAA, municipalities could easily prevent group homes for recovering substance
abusers from entering their communities by enacting zoning ordinances that explicitly
distinguish between disabled and non-disabled persons.").
170 Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346; Zanner, supra note 45, at 261 (arguing that a
disabled person should have the right to reside wherever he orshe chooses to, absent risk to the
health or safety of others posed by the disabled person); see also Todus, supra note 1, at 761
(arguing that City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995), will have a
significant impact on helping handicapped persons secure housing by rendering invalid many
ordinances that previously regulated group living situations by defining what constitutes a
"family" or by limiting occupancy).
171 Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346; see, Kanter, supra note 1, at 951; Simring, supra
note 1, at 450.
172 See discussion supra Part M; Seng, supra note 6, at 556 (stating that, allowing a
blind person to live with a seeing-eye dog, and arranging a parking space for a person whose
mobility is impaired, are examples of reasonable accommodations).
173 Soper, supra note 29, at 1065.
'
74 See Kanter, supra note 1, at 933-34; Simring, supra note 1, at 450. See generally,
Lerblance, supra note 1, at 352-53.
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redress for such grievances is an important first step toward achieving the
goal of eradication of unsubstantiated fears and prejudices against
handicapped persons which often result in segregating them from
society.'75 For both mentally disabled persons and physically disabled
persons, who have traditionally been marginalized, the FHAA has opened,
and will surely continue to open, doors to housing opportunities that never
before existed for them. 176
Despite the significant impact the FHAA may have on future
opportunities for disabled persons in the housing arena, it is only a limited
mechanism. 7  Imposing an affirmative obligation of "reasonable
accommodation" on landlords will surely make easier the task of
integrating disabled persons into mainstream society with respect to
housing. 178 Its capacity to provide relief is restricted in its scope by the
nature of the disability in question and the cost to the landlord of making
the accommodation. 179 Fortunately, it appears to be successful in helping
to augment the availability of housing opportunities for disabled persons,1 80
as well as increasing the degree of use and enjoyment by disabled persons
... See Caruso, supra note 42, at 343 (concluding that "handicapped residents possess
a powerful tool in the reasonable accommodation provision of the [FHAA] when dealing with
an inflexible landlord or other housing provider."). See generally Kanter, supra note 1, at 936,
943. Todus, supra note 1, at 762 (arguing that the Edmonds decision reflects an attitude of
decreased tolerance of invidious discrimination).
176 See Lerblance, supra note 1, at 346.
'7 See Seng, supra note 6, at 565 (arguing that, while the FHAA addresses certain
forms of discrimination, it fails to "declare that there is a right to housing under federal law.");
Malkin, supra note 1, at 791 (commenting that the reasonable accommodation provision of the
FHAA is "the least recognized, most misconstrued way to protect and enforce the housing rights
of disabled persons.").
17 See Kanter, supra note 1, at 961-62; Todus, supra note 1, at 738 (arguing that the
United States Supreme Court "plans to follow the Congressional intent to pronounce a national
commitment to prohibit exclusions of handicapped persons from the American mainstream on
the basis of stereotypes and ignorance."). See generally Soper, supra note 29, at 1065.
179 See Rusinov, 1995 WL 399384 at 12; Shapiro, 844 F.Supp. at 121; Southeastern
Community College, 442 U.S. at 405.
"' See Seng, supra note 6, at 566 (opining that by the enactment of the FHAA,
"Congress has taken a giant step forward in insuring that decent, safe, and sanitary housing is
available to all persons in the United States.").
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of their residences. 181  Moreover, while no statutory enactment can
transform or entirely eliminate societal prejudices, laws can and do send
a message to people about which behaviors will not be tolerated.'82
When the FHAA was enacted, legislators were aware that mere
"even handed treatment" was inadequate to address the discrimination
against disabled persons that had long existed.8 3 As a powerful response
to that discrimination, the inclusion of the "reasonable accommodation"
clause enunciates a powerful statement by Congress. It represents the
sentiment that the special needs of the disabled must be accommodated,
and the belief that stereotyping that results in segregation is intolerable. 184
Thus, in order to be effective in its mission to eliminate the tradition of
discrimination faced by disabled persons in their pursuit of housing
equality, the FHAA ought to be construed liberally so as to afford the
protections it purports to provide.8 5 At the same time, exclusions from the
FHAA should be interpreted narrowly in order to bolster the advances
already made by disabled persons in the housing arena.'86 Using this
interpretative scheme, courts should continue to "tip the scales in favor of
the handicapped residents except in the most extreme circumstances...
The success of the FHAA as a weapon in the war against
... See generally, Miller, supra note 34, at 1517.
182 See Seng, supra note 6, at 565-66; see also Caruso, supra note 42, at 345-48.
183 Malkin, supra note 1, at 818.
184 Id. at 816 (interpreting Congress' choice to include the "reasonable
accommodation" clause in the FHAA as representing a "recogni[tion] that positive steps must
be taken to meet the housing needs" of disabled persons); see Miller, supra note 34, at 1514
(arguing that the "reasonable accommodation" clause was incorporated in order to "balance the
interests of the handicapped against those of the other members of the community."); Seng,
supra note 6, at 557 (stating that "stereotypes about retarded persons or about those who are
mentally ill will not be tolerated under the [FHAA].").
18' See Malkin, supra note 1, at 818, 819 (arguing that Congress intended the
reasonable accommodations clause to have a far-reaching effect, and that, "[ais a remedial
statute, the FHAA must be 'interpreted generously."').
186 Id. at 819 (advocating that exemptions contained in the FHAA should be read
narrowly).
187 Caruso, supra note 42, at 343 (referring to the balance that courts must strike
between the specific needs of the individual making the request, on the one hand, and the burden
such a request imposes on the landlord, on the other).
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discrimination depends largely on the way in which courts employ the
"reasonable accommodation" clause in defining what must be proven in
a case of housing discrimination. To the extent that courts employ that
provision as an independent means for proving discrimination rather than
as merely an element of another method of proof, the success of the
FHAA will be proportionate. Under the terms of the FHAA, the failure
to make a reasonable accommodation for a disabled tenant when one
would be necessary to provide him with full use and enjoyment of a
dwelling, and would not be an unreasonable imposition on the landlord,
is itself a violation. Unless and until courts acknowledge this additional,
independent means for establishing the existence of a discriminatory
practice, the full success of the FHAA cannot be realized.
Even though the FHAA is still in its infancy, it promises to have
a significant impact on both increasing societal awareness of the special
housing needs that people with disabilities often have and on
demonstrating societal willingness to provide for those needs.'88 With the
enactment in 1988 of the FHAA, "our history of degrading and
dehumanizing people with mental disabilities by denying them the basic
right to live where and how they choose"'89 appears to be ending.
Hopefully, this is but the first of many steps down the path toward
eventual equality for all.' 9 °
"RId. at 348 (concluding that the FHAA "requires communities as well as individual
landlords to recognize equal opportunities for handicapped members of group homes or
handicapped individual homeowners."); Keith Aoki, Fair HousingAmendments Act of 1988,
24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RFv. 249,263 (1989) (concluding that "the FHAA... could eliminate
artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers that discriminatory conduct establishes.").
189 Kanter, supra note 1, at 933.
"gSee Seng, supra note 6, at 566. He argues that the FHAA represents a "giant step
forward in insuring that decent, safe, and sanitary housing is available to all persons in the
United States." Id. Nevertheless, "housing advocates cannot rest ... until Congress or the courts
go further and declare that decent, safe, and sanitary housing is the right of every person living
in the United States." Id. (emphasis in original).
469

